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This paper analyses the impact of quality based labelling on product prices, 
factor allocation and the resulting effects on producers within the context of an 
international trading system.  A general equilibrium model, calibrated to 1998 data, 
describes United States and European Union labelling regimes for genetically 
modified agricultural products.  The results indicate that the labelling choice of trade 
partners have large distributive impacts within national economies, as well as across 
countries and highlight the importance of using general equilibrium framework to 
understand the system wide impacts of labelling policies that differentiate products 
based upon quality characteristics.  These results are essential for policy makers 
seeking to understand the global and domestic economic implications of 
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Who Benefits from Quality Labelling? 
 
Segregation Costs, International Trade and Producer Outcomes 
 
 
1.  Introduction 
  Labelling regulations have been proposed as potential solutions to many 
international environmental policy conflicts.  Advocates of labelling argue that 
consumers have the right to know about the environmental quality impacts of their 
consumption choices even when these impacts occur outside the borders of their 
domestic home.  Armed with this information consumers can consider environmental 
consequences of their consumption choices, and thus a market for differentiated goods 
may develop in which higher quality goods (for example, environmentally friendly or 
GM-free) are sold at higher prices than low quality goods.  Examples of these price 
premiums occur in different types of quality-differentiated markets.  For example, in 
the late 1980’s dolphin-safe tuna was sold for $400/ton more than tuna caught using 
fishing techniques that threatened dolphins [15].  In the US, in 1999 price premiums 
for non-GM soybeans were about 2-3 percent of the price of GM soybeans[11].  
Consumer willingness to pay for perceived high quality characteristics creates the 
opportunity for product differentiation, however a complex system of economic 
interactions will determine the size of the price premium and the distributive impacts 
of product differentiation. 
The relative prices will depend upon a variety of economic conditions 
including consumer perception of the value of quality characteristics, who bears the 
costs of segregating products, and, for goods traded on the international market, 
whether trading partners have also adopted labelling regulations.  Furthermore, the 
relative prices and price premiums determine which producers capture the benefits  
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from price differentials and which producers suffer from decreases in final good prices 
or increases in intermediate good prices.  The effects of segregation are felt broadly 
through the economy regardless of which sector pays for the segregation initially.   
A diverse literature has arisen relating to the effects of labelling regimes on 
prices.  Much of the research focuses on the consumers’ willingness to pay for 
additional quality (see for example 23, 17, and 2).  To a lesser extent the literature 
also explores the incentives for producers to adopt labelling in order to reap the 
benefits of price premiums (see for example 19) and the potentially perverse outcomes 
on environmental condition associated with eco-labelling regimes [16, 20].  In most 
cases, however, the research has ignored the general equilibrium economic impacts of 
resource re-allocation generated by labelling requirements and thus does not explore 
the distributive consequences of these policies. 
When differentiated products are traded on the international market the policy 
choices of trading partners will influence the relative prices of the differentiated 
products.  Nimon and Beghin  provide a stylized analysis of the impact of eco-labels 
in the international trade context focusing on the dynamic of North-South trade [18].  
They find that there are strategic incentives for countries to adopt eco-labels in order 
to differentiate the quality attributes of their products and reach target consumer 
markets.  While Nimon and Beghin highlight the potential strategic nature of labelling 
policy decisions within the international trading system, their analysis ignores the role 
of mobile and fixed factors in determining the distribution of impacts among 
producers. 
The goal of this paper is to analyse the impact of quality based labelling on 
product prices, factor allocation and the resulting effects on producers within the 
context of an international trading system.  The analysis is based upon a model,  
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developed in detail in Jackson (2002), that was initially applied to labelling regimes 
for the genetically modified (GM) content of agricultural products [13].  The general 
equilibrium model, calibrated to 1998 data, is used to examine trade between the EU 
and US; two markets that differ dramatically in attitudes towards and production of 
GM products.  While the model does not explicitly examine eco-labelling regimes, by 
highlighting the importance of quality attributes and international regulatory 
environment, the analysis provides insights into labelling policies that differentiate 
products based upon the environmental impacts of their production. 
This paper will examine how regulatory frameworks and costs associated with 
segregation interact to influence relative prices.
1  The paper focuses on the impact of 
mandated labelling policies rather than upon the use of labels as a strategic choice by 
producers to access new markets.  This focus leads to the adoption of a model in 
which producers are perfectly competitive.  While this assumption probably does not 
fully characterize the dynamics of eco-labelling, the analysis described below provides 
a first step in understanding the impacts on prices of labelling systems within the 
international trade context. 
The paper proceeds as follows.  Section 2 defines the analytical model of 
international trade in products differentiated by GM.  Next, section 3 describes results, 
highlighting the impact of segregation costs and regulatory regimes on prices 
premiums and thus on the distribution of producer benefits within the two economies.  
The results represent a stylised version of global economy and suggest an alternative 
                                                 
1 The paper focuses on the current generation of GM crops – those that alter the productive 
characteristics of commodity crops.  The next generation of GM crops will include products that offer 
explicit benefits to consumer benefits.  For example, they may include health-improving characteristics 
or they may have longer shelf life.  The analysis for these types of crops will differ.  The direction of 
the price premiums between GM and non-GM crops will be reversed because consumers will be willing 
to pay extra to consume the GM products with enhanced consumption characteristics. 
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method for analysing the global impacts of labelling to identify quality characteristics.  
The concluding section, Section 4 discusses the policy implications of the research 
results and provides suggestions for further research. 
2.  A Model of Quality Differentiated Goods 
The model described below can describe an economy with labelling and an 
economy without labelling and is based upon a model developed in detail in Jackson 
2002 [13].  Two critical features of the model capture the unique system of economic 
interactions related to GM labelling. First, primary producers use additional labour 
when labelling is required.  Second, the model assumes that consumers care about 
quality attributes associated with GM products.  Appendix 1 provides details of model 
specification. 
Production 
Production is structured as a simple Viner-Ricardo economy with seven 
sectors.  Each sector uses labor and a fixed factor, hence there are eight factors of 
production: labor and seven others corresponding to the seven sectors in the economy.  
Labour moves freely between sectors and sector labour demand is defined for sector.  
Each sector also uses one fixed factor which might be land or other sector specific 
capital.  The fixed factors are assumed to be exogenously determined, while labour 
distribution is endogenous to the model. 
Production in each economy is split between industrial (sector 1), three 
primary agricultural production (sectors 2, 3, and 6) and three marketed agricultural 
production (sectors 4, 5, and 7).  The three types of marketed agricultural production 
represent traditional corn and soy products (C/S), GM C/S products, and all non-C/S  
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agricultural production.
2  The marketed agricultural products use primary agricultural 
products as inputs.  Specifically, good 2 is an intermediate input in the production of 
good 4, good 3 is an intermediate input in the production of good 5 and good 6 is an 
intermediate input in the production of good 7.  All production functions are assumed 
to be Cobb-Douglass. 
The analytical structure of the model supports the definition of sectoral GDP 
functions, which in turn can be used to describe returns to fixed factors.  Returns to 
fixed factors can be used a proxy for rents accrued to each sector and may be written 
) , ( j j j p w R R =   for j=1,2,3 and 6    (1) 
) , , ( j mj j j p p w R R =    for j=4,5, and 7     (2) 
When an economy is not segregating GM from non-GM products, farmers sell 
primary agricultural products mixed together to the agricultural marketers.  The 
agricultural marketers in turn sell a final mixed product for a single price.  In contrast 
when a country requires labelling of GM products, primary agricultural producers use 
labour to segregate the traditional from the GM agricultural varieties.  The assumption 
that segregation activities occur in the primary agricultural production sectors reflects 
the costs to the economy of segregation and can be thought of as the effort necessary 
to preserve product identity in the marketing chain.  Agricultural marketers purchase 
segregated inputs and produce a GM and a non-GM final good.  These differentiated 
products are then sold to the agricultural marketers for different prices. 
Consumption 
In the case of GM crops, labels can either identify products whose GM content 
surpasses a specified level, or they can identify products whose GM content falls 
                                                 
2 Corn and soy are described separately from other agricultural products because these products were 
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below a specified level.  Drawing on Lancaster’s classic treatment of consumption 
choices based upon characteristics rather than goods agricultural products have two 
characteristics that are important to consumers: taste and ''quality.''[14]   Taste can be 
thought of as the classic consumption good characteristic. The taste of GM and 
traditional agricultural products are identical and consumers gain more utility by 
consuming more.  Quality is directly related to the GM content of foods.  As GM 
content increases, quality decreases.  Hence, including quality in the utility function 
captures consumers' ambivalence towards GM foods.  (Or, in the context of eco-labels 
this structure allows consumers to express their preferences for goods that have been 
produced using environmentally friendly production methods.)  With labelling, 
consumers have complete information about the GM content of agricultural products 
and have access to pure traditional crops.  They can avoid consuming GM crops or if 
they are unconcerned about GM content, they can choose the cheaper GM product. 
  Consumers choose a vector of demand goods to maximize utility.  Consumers 
in each country are assumed to have quasi-homothetic preferences and thus may differ 
in the amount of GM content they consume [5].  Arguments of the utility functions are 
the vector of demand for final goods (x) and quality (Q).  Quality affects utility 
through the consumption of final goods, and in the labelling case.  Recall that sector 7 
is marketed GM agricultural products.  Then, quality may be represented as 
) ( 7 x Q Q =  
In contrast, in the non-labelling case, quality may be represented as 
) ( m x Q Q =  
                                                                                                                                            
the first widely adopted GM varieties.  For example, in 1998 the more than 40 percent of total US soy 
acreage and nearly 20% of corn acreage were planted in GM varieties [1]  
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where xm represents demand for the non-labelled mixture of marketed GM and non-
GM product (xm=x4+x7).  Both quality functions are continuously decreasing, linear 
functions of final goods.  Utility may be written,   )  ,  (  Q  x  U  U  i  i =   where Ui(x,Q) is 
strictly increasing in all arguments.   
Trade Labelling Equilibria 
Three types of trade equilibria can be calculated from the above model.  These 
are : neither country labelling, both countries labelling and the case where countries 
adopt different labelling approaches.  With the calibration to data, this last equilibrium 
can describe two different cases – one with the US labelling and the EU not labelling 
and one with the EU labelling and the US not labelling.  The equilibrium conditions 
define all prices, labour wages, and returns to fixed factors.
3  (See [13] for a complete 
definition of equilibrium conditions.)  
  At an equilibrium, the price premium is the difference between the price for 
the final high quality and low quality good.  While this model does not lead to closed 
form solutions for this function, the simulations reported below demonstrate the 
effects of exogenous segregation costs and trading relationships on this price 
premium. 
The Data 
  The model is calibrated to 1998 US, EU and World data from a variety of 
sources.
 4   Production elasticities are assumed to be the same within both countries. 
                                                 
3 In the world market when countries are pursuing mixed labelling strategies (ie. One country labelling 
while the other country mixes traditional and GM products) the mixed product is treated as a GM 
product.  The mixed product produced by the non-labelling country is sold for the same final price on 
the world market as the pure GM product produced by the segregating country.   
4 Data was collected from the following sources: 3,4, 6,7, 8,9, 10, 12, 21, and 22.  Data is calculated for 
the European Union as represented by 15 members: France, Germany, Italy, the Netherlands, Belgium, 
Luxemburg, United Kingdom, Ireland, Denmark, Spain, Portugal, Greece, Austria, Finland and 
Sweden.  
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Demand elasticities are the same across physical products but differ in relation to 
quality preferences.  In the simulations the US consumer is assumed not to place any 
value on the quality characteristics (epUS=0).  The EU, on the other hand, gains utility 
from increased quality (0<epEU<em).  Because data on quality preferences did not exist 
at the time of this modelling exercise, this parameter (epEU) is synthesized and 
sensitivity analyses are conducted to ensure that the chosen parameter is reasonable.  
These demand assumptions lead to a specialization in consumption where the US 
consumers consume only the relatively cheaper GM products if given the choice, and 
the EU consumers choose the more expensive non-GM products. 
  All elasticities are the same as in the non-segregated model but an additional 
elasticity is used to calculate the joint-output function that is used to capture the 
segregation process for GM and non-GM agricultural production.  The model is 
solved for a range of costs in order to examine the impact of costs and regulatory 
structure.  In this model the cost parameter (s), influences all final and intermediate 
good prices as well as wages.   
3.  Results 
  The following analysis focuses on the effects of regulatory frameworks and the 
costs of segregation on prices of segregated goods and returns to fixed factors at the 
industry level.  While the model assumes that the costs of segregation are born 
initially by primary agricultural producers, due to the general equilibrium nature of the 
model, the effects of these costs can be traced through the economy to other sectors.  
The analysis focuses on presenting the effects on relative prices of GM and non-GM 
crops with the aim of inferring effects on economic groups of changes in costs.  The 
                                                                                                                                            
4 Labor elasticity (a) for sector 1 in both countries is .67.  Labor elasticity (b) for sectors 2, 3, and 6 in 
both countries is .35.  Labor elasticity (d1) for sectors 4, 5, and 7 in both countries is .26.  Intermediate  
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determinants of prices are suppressed in the following discussion to simplify notation.  
In the following discussion GM crops are referred to as low quality and non-GM crops 
as high quality reflecting the assumptions about consumer preferences in the EU. 
Price Premia 
  Figure 1 illustrates how the price premiums change with respect to increasing 
costs in the three labelling scenarios: US labelling, EU labelling and both labelling.  
Two features are immediately evident from this figure.  First, the size of the price 
premiums varies substantially across the different labelling regimes.  The largest price 
premium is obtained when only the US is labelling, the lowest when both countries 
are labelling. 
Second, the relationship of price premiums with the cost parameter varies 
among the labelling regimes.  When only the US is labelling, price premiums decline 
monotonically with respect to increasing s.  When only the EU is labelling price 
premiums exhibit a concave relationship with s.  Finally when both countries 
segregate the price premium increases monotonically as s increases.  The relationship 
between high quality and low quality product prices and costs underlie these results 
for the price premiums (See table I).  The following analysis describes variations in 
the price-cost relationships among the three labelling scenarios. 
Case 1:  US Labelling 
When only the US is segregating, prices of both high quality and low quality 
final goods decrease with increasing costs (Table I).   
0 <
ds
dp j for j = 4 and 7 
                                                                                                                                            
input elasticity (d2) for sectors 4, 5, and 7 in both countries is .26.  
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Given the decreases in premiums over the range of costs examined, this result 
indicates that the price for high quality good (p4) is more sensitive to changes in costs 
than the price for low quality products (p7).   
To understand this result, first consider the cost impacts of the initial adoption 
of labelling on the high quality product.  In the general equilibrium framework, adding 
segregation costs alters the distribution of labour across sectors.  In the world market, 
the high quality good is entirely produced by the US and only demanded by the EU 
consumer.  Wages increase in the US where US labour moves out of the 
manufacturing and final high quality sectors and into intermediate good production 
and the production of final low quality products.  The contracting effect of decreased 
labour to final high quality production is compensated for by the decrease in 
intermediate good prices due to the expansion of the intermediate goods market.  
Wage decreases in the EU causes a decrease in income, however the demand-side 
effects are smaller than the supply effects.  Hence the total effect of increased US 
segregation costs on the world market for high quality good is lower equilibrium price 
(p4) and a higher market demand for high quality products relative to the non-labelling 
case. 
  For the low quality product the equilibrium effects are complicated by the fact 
that the world market contains product from both the US and the EU.  As segregation 
costs (in the US) increase, EU labour moves out of agriculture into manufacturing.  
With this labour reallocation, agricultural production within the EU contracts.  At the 
same time, in the US production of low quality good is expanding due primarily to 
decreased prices of low quality intermediate goods.  Since the EU produces low 
quality goods at a much smaller scale than the US, the expansion in the US dominates 
the world market and the world market price for low quality final good (p7) decreases.  
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Case 2:  EU Labelling 
  In contrast to the previous case, when only the EU labels the relationship of 
final good prices to costs differs between goods (Table I).  As costs increase, p7 





for all s 
In the US the prices for high quality and low quality products are the same and that the 
mixed marketed agricultural product is treated as a low quality product on the world 
market.  Since both decreasing primary agricultural product prices and increasing 
wages influence low quality product supply in the US, it is clear from these results 
that the decreases in intermediate prices dominate the effect of increasing wages 
leading to an expansion in supply. 
In this case the price premium exhibits a convex shape over the range of costs 
examined.  Since, p7 decreases monotonically as costs increase, the convexity of the 
price premium curve must be driven by the price for high quality products (p4).  










for high s 
For low costs, the price premium increases, since p4 is increasing over this range of s 
and p7 is decreasing.  At higher cost levels the price premium decreases because for 
each incremental increase in costs p4 decreases more than p7. 
  Why do prices behave this way?  The joint production function describes 
segregation by the EU primary agricultural producers.  In this calibrated model the EU 
low quality agricultural production is only a small fraction of the total primary  
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agricultural production.  The primary production sector attracts an increasing amount 
of total labour as segregation costs increase.  Production requires labour for 
segregation activities and productive activities.  Totally differentiating the labor 
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where vLseg represents the labour allocated to segregation rather the production 
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ds
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dv LS L  and   0 <
ds
dvLseg  
The effect of 
ds
dvL6  on these relationships is negligible due to the small scale of 
production of low quality crops. 
Case 3:  Both Countries Labelling 
When both countries segregate prices for high and low quality intermediates 
and final goods increase at low costs and decrease at higher costs (Table I).  
Nevertheless, the price premium between final goods increases over the range of costs 
examined.  This implies that at low costs, the price of the high quality good is 
increasing more for each incremental change in costs than the low quality good.  At 
higher costs, this relationship is reversed – the price for low quality good is decreasing 




dp 7 4 >  for low s  




dp 7 4 <  for high s 
Prices of intermediate goods, except for the price for high quality goods in the EU 
(p62), also have a similar relationship with s.   
Prices of intermediate goods in the US are closer to each other than prices of 
intermediate goods in the EU.  Also the prices for low quality intermediates are higher 
in the US than in the EU while the prices for high quality intermediates are higher in 
the EU.  These price differences reflect the input demand of agricultural marketers for 
intermediate inputs.  In the EU, low quality production represents only a small share 
of the total agricultural production. 
Table II highlights the expansion and contraction effects of costs on the 
various sectors of the economy.  At low costs, as costs increase nearly all the sectors 
related to labelling contract, while at high costs increasing costs lead to expansion of 
these sectors.
 5  As in the previous case these effects are related to the distribution of 
labour among segregation and production activities.   
Sectoral Returns to Fixed Factors 
  This section describes three types of distributive impacts: the distribution of 
sectoral fixed factor returns between GM and non-GM goods, between primary and 
marketing sectors, and between the same sectors in different economies.  As described 
above, the returns to fixed factors change depending upon which labelling scenario is 
in place and the costs of segregation.  These characteristics alter economic 
relationships differently.  The labelling scenario creates an abrupt change in product 
classification and hence in demand effects.  After a country has committed to a 
labelling strategy the costs affect returns incrementally.  In all simulations, except one,  
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the level of segregation costs does not affect whether a sector benefits or loses from a 
labelling choice as compared to the case where neither country is labelling. 
  By decomposing returns to fixed factors in relation to costs it is possible to 
identify which sectors benefit from increased costs and which experience decreasing 
returns.  Totally differentiation of equations 1 and 2 indicates the effect of marginal 













































=  for j=4,5, and 7 
The effect of changes in wages and prices on returns to fixed factors can also 
be determined analytically as mentioned in section 2.   In all sectors increases in final 
agricultural good prices lead to increased sectoral returns.  Increases in final good 
prices have positive impacts on intermediate good prices.  Since intermediate goods 
are inputs in the final good sector and outputs in the intermediate good sector, the 
price effect of intermediate good prices is negative on the returns to final good sectors 
and positive on the returns to intermediate good sectors. 
  Tables III, IV and V represent the relative returns to the fixed factors in each 
sector in the US and the EU under the three different labelling scenarios relative to the 
case in which neither country labels.  These relative returns are reported for low 
values of s (s=.01) and high values of s (s=.2).  In both countries, the sectors that 
benefit from labelling differ depending upon the labelling choices of trading partners.   
                                                                                                                                            
5   The exception is the GM intermediate production in the EU which is a relatively small user of labor 
and therefore does not play a large role in determining the general equilibrium outcome.  
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Case 1:  US segregating (Table III) 
When the US is labelling and the EU is not labelling, the high quality primary 
and marketing sectors (sectors 2 and 4) in the US benefit substantially as compared to 
the case when neither country labels.  These returns are driven by the large price 
increase for high quality goods in this scenario.  The sectors associated with low 
quality product production (sectors 6 and 7) experience lower fixed factor returns than 
in the case when neither country is labelling.   
In the EU all sectors associated with the labelling (2,4,6 and 7) experience 
lower fixed factor returns than in the case where neither country labels.  Recall that in 
the EU high and low quality goods are sold for the same price because producers are 
not segregating these products.  Therefore the sectors associated with production of 
high quality goods do not benefit from higher prices in the same way that they do in 
the US segregated economy. 
As costs increase fixed factor returns to the US high quality production sectors 
and the low quality intermediate production sector decrease, while returns to fixed 
factors in production of the final low quality good increase as costs increase.  (The 
returns in this case are still less than the returns in the case when neither country is 
labelling.)  At higher costs more of the cost burden is shifted to the producers of the 
high quality.  Although the EU is not incurring the direct segregation costs, all EU 
sectors associated with experience decreasing returns to fixed factors with increasing 
costs.   
Decomposing these returns by the effect of costs on the fixed factor returns in 
the low quality good sector indicates that intermediate price effects on fixed factor 
returns dominate the final good and wage effects.  
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.  Therefore, the wage effect is 
negative, the intermediate price effect is positive and the final price effect is negative.  
However according to simulations the left hand side of this equation is positive 
(
ds
dR7 >0) therefore the effect of costs on sectoral returns to the low quality good sector 
must be dominated by the intermediate price effect.  In contrast, in the EU, 
















.  Therefore, in 
the case of the EU, the returns to sector 7 are dominated by the final good price 
effects. 
Case 2:  EU segregating (Table IV).   
The returns to intermediate and final high quality goods sectors in theEU and 
to final low quality goods sector (sectors 2, 4, and 7) increase relative to the no 
labelling case.  In contrast to the results when only the US labels, the final low quality 
good sector in the labelling economy (in this case the EU) obtains positive benefits 
from labelling.  The price for intermediate low quality goods drops, while the price of 
intermediate high quality goods increase relative to the no labelling scenario.   
Again focusing on the returns to final low quality goods we can determine the 
effect of costs on relative returns after the EU has committed to labelling.  In this case, 











.  From assumptions  
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.  Therefore, the wage effect 
is negative, the intermediate price effect is positive and the final price effect is 
negative.  Again according to simulation results, the left hand side of this equation is 
positive (
ds
dR7 >0) therefore the cost effect on sectoral returns to the low quality good 
sector must be dominated by the intermediate price effect.  The results for the low 
quality good sector in the US are similar to the EU low quality final good sector in the 
previous scenario. 
Finally simulations of this scenario indicate that the returns to fixed factors in 
the high quality good sectors (2 and 4) increase at low costs and decrease at high 





















































.  Because the EU is incurring 
the original segregation costs, the simulations show, as expected,  0 >
ds
dw
.  Therefore, 
combining these results, we can see that the cost effect on fixed factor returns in the 
high quality final good sector is dominated at low costs by the final price effect.  At 
higher costs, the positive impact of decreasing intermediate good prices on returns to 
fixed factors is outweighed by the negative impact of increasing wages and decreasing 
final good prices.  
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Returns to sectors over time will depend upon whether it is assumed that the 
costs of segregation are increasing or decreasing.
6  In this case, the returns to fixed 
factors in the low quality final goods sector increase with increasing costs and the 
returns to fixed factors in high quality final goods sector decrease with increasing 
costs.  This suggests that the high quality agricultural marketers are more burdened 
than the GM agricultural marketers by segregation costs.  However, at the same time, 
both sectors benefit from segregation, therefore it is not a question of who benefits 
and who loses from labelling, but rather who benefits more. 
Case 3:  Both Segregating (Table V) 
Finally, when both countries are labelling, the intermediate good sectors in 
general bear the original cost of segregation, and segregation leads to benefits in final 
good sectors.  The final high and low quality goods sectors (sector 4 and 7) experience 
increased returns to fixed factors in both the EU and the US relative to the no labelling 
case.  Only the high quality intermediate good sector in the EU experiences increased 
returns.  The positive relative returns in sector 2 in the EU are related to the scale of 
production effect discussed in the previous section relative to price changes.    
In this scenario, in the US both the high quality and low quality goods have 
positive returns, but as costs increase the returns to the high quality product increase, 




























                                                 
6 Either assumption is possible and depends upon, among other factors, the scale of agricultural 
production of the high and low quality products.  
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.  At low costs, the returns to fixed factors in the high quality final good 
















.  Therefore, at higher cost levels, the returns to this sector are 
dominated by the intermediate price effects.  In the low quality final good sector 
returns are dominated at low costs by the intermediate good prices and at higher costs 
by the final good prices. 
In the EU the final good high quality sector experiences decreasing returns to 
fixed factors with increasing costs whereas the final good low quality sector 
experiences increasing returns to fixed factors.  In the EU, as in the US, the returns to 
fixed factors for the high quality sector are, at low costs, dominated by the final good 
price effect and at high costs dominated by the intermediate price effect. 
4.  Policy Implications 
A common assumption about environmental labelling regimes is that primary 
agricultural producers will incur increased costs but will be compensated by higher 
prices for their products.  However, the results described above indicate that in the 
general equilibrium framework the price effects of trading relationships and regulatory 
behaviour will ultimately determine the relative returns to sectors within and across 
economies.  Depending upon the structure of the economies, the scale of production 
and domestic and foreign consumer preferences for quality, the economic benefits of  
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labelling may accrue to sectors (and/or countries) other than those responsible for the 
initial product segregation.  These results are essential for policy makers seeking to 
understand the global and domestic economic implications of environmental labelling 
systems. 
This model illustrates the importance of the labelling decisions of trading 
partners, the current cost structure of segregation, and whether these costs are 
expected to increase or decrease.  In some cases increasing costs will lead to a larger 
price premiums and larger differences among primary good and final good producers.  
In other cases, costs will have the opposite effect.  Therefore, a one-dimensional focus 
on the cost structure of product differentiation ignores important general equilibrium 
price effects that ultimately determine distributive impacts. 
This analysis is incomplete because it does not include different types of 
consumers within each country and it assumes that labelling policies are mandated 
rather than voluntarily adopted.  Nevertheless, it provides a preliminary framework for 
understanding the distributive effects of labelling within international trading systems 
and helps clarify the relative role of segregation costs and labelling regimes in 
determining winners and losers.  Further research will examine the incentives for 
political lobbying that arise given the distributive impacts of quality labelling regimes. 
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Table I:  Relationship of intermediate and final good prices with respect to costs 
 
  dp2/ds  dp4/ds  dp6/ds  dp7/ds 
  US  EU  World  US  EU  World 
US Segregating  <0 all s  <0 all s  <0 all s  <0 all s  <0 all s  <0 all s 
EU Segregating  <0 all s  >0 low s 
<0 high s 
>0 low s 
<0 high s 
<0 all s  <0 all s  <0 all s 
Both Segregating  >0 low s 
<0 high s 
>0 low s 
<0 high s 
>0 low s 
<0 high s 
>0 low s 
<0 high s 
<0 all s  >0 low s 
<0 high s 
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Table II.  Relationship of sector output with respect to costs 
  dy2/ds  dy4/ds  dy6/ds  dy7/ds 
  US  EU  US  EU  US  EU  US  EU 
US 
Segregating 
>0 all s  <0 all s  >0 all s  <0 all s  >0 all s  <0 all s  >0 all s  <0 all s 
EU 
Segregating 
<0 all s  <0 low s 
>0 high s 
<0 for all s 
 
<0 low s 
>0 high s 
<0 all s  >0 all s  <0 all s  >0 all s 
Both 
Segregating 
<0 low s 
>0 high s 
<0 low s 
>0 high s 
>0 alls  <0 low s 
>0 high s 
<0 low s 
>0 high s 
> 0 all s  <0 low s 
>0 high s 
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Table III.  Relative change in returns to fixed factors US segregating - relative to the 
case when neither country labels. 
  
  US   EU  
R1  Low s: -0.004 
High s: -0.004 
Low s: 0.004 
High s: 0.004 
R2  Low s: 8.241 
High s: 4.337 
Low s: -0.802 
High s: -0.811 
R 3  Low s: -0.005 
High s: -0.005 
Low s: -0.001 
High s: -0.002 
R 4  Low s: 14.611 
High s: 14.497 
Low s: -0.802 
High s: -0.811 
R 5  Low s: -0.005 
High s: -0.005 
Low s: -0.001 
High s: -0.002 
R 6  Low s: -0.847 
High s: -0.915 
Low s: -0.792 
High s: -0.818 
R 7  Low s: -0.780 
High s: -0.733 
Low s: -0.798 
High s: -0.809 
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Table IV.  Relative change in returns to fixed factors in the case where EU labels 
relative to the case when neither country labels.  
  US returns  EU returns 
R 1  Low s: 0.000 
High s: 0.000 
Low s: -0.001 
High s: -0.001 
R 2  Low s: -0.111 
High s: -0.124 
Low s: 0.464 
High s: 0.217 
R 3  Low s: -0.002 
High s: -0.002 
Low s: -0.001 
High s: -0.0018 
R 4  Low s: -0.121 
High s: -0.134 
Low s: 0.281 
High s: 0.280 
R 5  Low s: 0.000 
High s: 0.000 
Low s: -0.001 
High s: -0.001 
R 6  Low s: -0.124 
High s: -0.136 
Low s: -0.673 
High s: -0.880 
R 7  Low s: -0.121 
High s: -0.134 
Low s: 0.350 
High s: 1.043 
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Table V:  Relative change in returns to fixed factors in the case where both countries 
label relative to the case when neither country labels. 
  US returns  EU returns 
R 1  Low s: -0.000 
High s: -0.000 
Low s: -0.001 
High s: -0.001 
R 2  Low s: -0.157 
High s: -0.389 
Low s: 0.322 
High s: 0.115 
R 3  Low s: -0.001 
High s: -0.001 
Low s: -0.001 
High s: -0.001 
R 4  Low s: 0.412 
High s: 0.497 
Low s: 0.157 
High s: 0.148 
R 5  Low s: -0.001 
High s: -0.001 
Low s: -0.001 
High s: -0.001 
R 6  Low s: -0.059 
High s: -0.263 
Low s: -0.559 
High s: -0.843 
R 7  Low s: 0.308 
High s: 0.289 
Low s: 0.816 
High s: 1.521 
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Appendix 1. 
The analytical model describes two economies that trade with each other and 
the rest of the world.  Each country (i) is endowed with a mobile factors, labor (v
i
L), 
and seven fixed sector-specific factors (v
i
j).  The model's equilibrium solution is based 













j) for j=4, 5 and 7 where w
i is the country-specific wage rate, p
i
mj 
is the country specific price of the intermediate good used in the production of j, and 
pj is the world price for final good j.  Since production functions are assumed to be 
Cobb-Douglass, and thus are nonempty, closed and satisfy the free disposal condition, 
the sectoral value-added functions have properties identical to traditional GNP 
functions [24].  The envelope properties of sectoral value-added functions can be used 



















j=2,3, and 6) for mj=2,3, and 6 where pj refers to the price of the final marketed good 
associated with the mj intermediate agricultural good).   
In the following description the country specific subscripts are suppressed for 
ease of notation.  Given the definitions for sectoral value added functions in the non-
segregated case, sectoral labor demand is defined as 
w
v p w G
v p w v
j j j
j j Lj ¶
¶
=
) , , (
) , , (      for j=1,2,3, and 6 
w
v p p w G
v p p w v
j mj j j
j mj j Lj ¶
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) , , , (
) , , , (    for j= 4,5, and 7 
Sectoral supply is defined as  
j
j j j
j j j p
v p w G




) , , (
) , , (      for j=1,2,3, and 6   
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( , , , )
j j mj j
j j mj j
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   for j=4,5, and 7 
Intermediate good demand from the marketing sectors is defined as  
( , , , )
( , , , )
j j mj j
mj j mj j
mj
G w p p v





  for j=5 and 7 
where the subscript ''mj'' refers to the intermediate good m used in the production of 
final good j.  In addition, in the non-segregated case, the demand for good 2 by sector 
4 is defined as 
4 7 2 4
2 7 2 4
2
( , , , )
( , , , )
G w p p v






where p7 is the world price of the un-segregated final product.   
  In the segregated case, primary agricultural producers use labor to segregate 
the traditional from the GM agricultural varieties, where “s” is the elasticity of labour 
used in segregating the GM from the non-GM intermediate goods.  The solution to the 
producer’s joint maximization problem provides a joint sectoral “segregation” GDP 
function for these two primary sectors: 
2 6 2 6 ( , , , , ) seg seg G G w p p v v =  
which has the same properties as the sectoral GDP functions described above.  The 
sectoral supply equations defined above change accordingly when producers are 
segregating.  Each of these products has a unique price.  Specifically, 
2 6 2 6
2 6 2 6
( , , , , )
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    for j=2 and 6 
Agricultural marketers purchase segregated inputs and produce a GM and a non-GM 
final good.    
  33 
  Given Cobb-Douglass production functions, the sectoral value added functions 
are separable in the fixed factors, vj..  Hence, sectoral value-added functions can be 
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